干旱区生态环境知识资源中心(Arid): Compatibilism and Retributivist Desert Moral Responsibility: On What is of Central Philosophical and Practical Importance

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DOI	10.1007/s10670-016-9846-2
	Compatibilism and Retributivist Desert Moral Responsibility: On What is of Central Philosophical and Practical Importance
	Caruso, Gregg D.; Morris, Stephen G.
通讯作者	Morris, SG (corresponding author), CUNY Coll Staten Isl, Dept Philosophy, Bldg 2N,Room 224,2800 Victory Blvd, Staten Isl, NY 10314 USA.
来源期刊	ERKENNTNIS
ISSN	0165-0106
EISSN	1572-8420
出版年	2017
卷号	82 期号:4 页码:837-855
英文摘要	Much of the recent philosophical discussion about free will has been focused on whether compatibilists can adequately defend how a determined agent could exercise the type of free will that would enable the agent to be morally responsible in what has been called the basic desert sense (see, e.g., Pereboom in Living without free will, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2001; Pereboom in Free will, agency, and meaning in life, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014; Strawson in Freedom and belief, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986; Strawson in Philos Stud 75(1):5-24, 1994; Fischer in Four views on free will, Wiley, Hoboken, 2007; Vargas in Four views on free will, Wiley, Hoboken, 2007; Vargas in Philos Stud, 144(1):45-62, 2009). While we agree with Derk Pereboom and others that the compatibilist's burden should be properly understood as providing a compelling account of how a determined agent could be morally responsible in the basic desert sense, the exact nature of this burden has been rendered somewhat unclear by the fact that there has been no definitive account given as to what the basic desert sense of moral responsibility amounts to. In Sect. 1 we set out to clarify the compatibilist's burden by presenting our account of basic desert moral responsibility-which we call retributivist desert moral responsibility for purposes of clarity-and explain why it is of central philosophical and practical importance to the free will debate. In Sect. 2 we employ a thought experiment to illustrate the kind of difficulty that compatibilists of any stripe are likely to encounter in attempting to explain how determined agents can exercise the kind of free will needed for retributivist desert moral responsibility.
类型	Article
语种	英语
收录类别	AHCI
WOS记录号	WOS:000405614100007
WOS关键词	FREE WILL ; IMPOSSIBILITY
WOS类目	Philosophy
WOS研究方向	Philosophy
资源类型	期刊论文
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.177/qdio/handle/2XILL650/361693
作者单位	[Caruso, Gregg D.] Corning Community Coll, Commun & Human Div, 1 Acad Dr, Corning, NY 14830 USA; [Morris, Stephen G.] CUNY Coll Staten Isl, Dept Philosophy, Bldg 2N,Room 224,2800 Victory Blvd, Staten Isl, NY 10314 USA
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Caruso, Gregg D.,Morris, Stephen G.. Compatibilism and Retributivist Desert Moral Responsibility: On What is of Central Philosophical and Practical Importance[J],2017,82(4):837-855.
APA	Caruso, Gregg D.,&Morris, Stephen G..(2017).Compatibilism and Retributivist Desert Moral Responsibility: On What is of Central Philosophical and Practical Importance.ERKENNTNIS,82(4),837-855.
MLA	Caruso, Gregg D.,et al."Compatibilism and Retributivist Desert Moral Responsibility: On What is of Central Philosophical and Practical Importance".ERKENNTNIS 82.4(2017):837-855.