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| DOI | 10.1007/s10677-014-9550-8 |
| An Emotional-Freedom Defense of Schadenfreude | |
| Spurgin, Earl | |
| 通讯作者 | Spurgin, E (corresponding author), John Carroll Univ, Dept Philosophy, 1 John Carroll Blvd, University Hts, OH 44118 USA. |
| 来源期刊 | ETHICAL THEORY AND MORAL PRACTICE
 |
| ISSN | 1386-2820 |
| EISSN | 1572-8447 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 卷号 | 18期号:4页码:767-784 |
| 英文摘要 | Schadenfreude is the emotion we experience when we obtain pleasure from others' misfortunes. Typically, we are not proud of it and admit experiencing it only sheepishly or apologetically. Philosophers typically view it, and the disposition to experience it, as moral failings. Two recent defenders of Schadenfreude, however, argue that it is morally permissible because it stems from judgments about the just deserts of those who suffer misfortunes. I also defend Schadenfreude, but on different grounds that overcome two deficiencies of those recent defenses. First, my defense accounts for the wide range of circumstances in which we experience Schadenfreude. Those circumstances often involve feelings and judgments that are less noble and admirable than judgments regarding just deserts. Second, it accounts for the sheepish or apologetic feelings that commonly accompany Schadenfreude. The two recent defenses can account for those feelings only by holding that they are mistaken or misguided. In opposition to those who view Schadenfreude as a moral failing, I argue that it is morally permissible unless it is part of a causal chain that produces an immoral act. The moral permissibility of the emotion is necessary in order for individuals to have the emotional freedom that, in turn, is necessary for their well-being. Schadenfreude's moral status is similar to a sexual fetish's. Like a fetish, experiencing Schadenfreude is not immoral in itself, but sharing and discussing it with others is immoral in many contexts. |
| 英文关键词 | Emotions Freedom Just deserts Misfortune Pleasure Schadenfreude |
| 类型 | Article |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 收录类别 | AHCI |
| WOS记录号 | WOS:000358782500009 |
| WOS关键词 | PRIVACY ; SYMPATHY ; ENVY ; RESENTMENT ; OTHERS ; DESERVINGNESS ; INTIMACY ; FAILURE ; OWN |
| WOS类目 | Philosophy |
| WOS研究方向 | Philosophy |
| 资源类型 | 期刊论文 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.177/qdio/handle/2XILL650/361503 |
| 作者单位 | John Carroll Univ, Dept Philosophy, University Hts, OH 44118 USA |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Spurgin, Earl. An Emotional-Freedom Defense of Schadenfreude[J],2015,18(4):767-784. |
| APA | Spurgin, Earl.(2015).An Emotional-Freedom Defense of Schadenfreude.ETHICAL THEORY AND MORAL PRACTICE,18(4),767-784. |
| MLA | Spurgin, Earl."An Emotional-Freedom Defense of Schadenfreude".ETHICAL THEORY AND MORAL PRACTICE 18.4(2015):767-784. |
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