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DOI | 10.1007/s10677-013-9442-3 |
Unjust Equalities | |
Albertsen, Andreas; Midtgaard, Soren Flinch | |
通讯作者 | Midtgaard, SF (corresponding author), Aarhus Univ, Aarhus, Denmark. |
来源期刊 | ETHICAL THEORY AND MORAL PRACTICE
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ISSN | 1386-2820 |
EISSN | 1572-8447 |
出版年 | 2014 |
卷号 | 17期号:2页码:335-346 |
英文摘要 | In the luck egalitarian literature, one influential formulation of luck egalitarianism does not specify whether equalities that do not reflect people's equivalent exercises of responsibility are bad with regard to inequality. This equivocation gives rise to two competing versions of luck egalitarianism: asymmetrical and symmetrical luck egalitarianism. According to the former, while inequalities due to luck are unjust, equalities due to luck are not necessarily so. The latter view, by contrast, affirms the undesirability of equalities as well as inequalities insofar as they are due to luck. The symmetrical view, we argue, is by far the more compelling, both by internal luck egalitarian standards and in light of the external rightist emphasis on choice and responsibility to which luck egalitarianism may partly be seen as a response. Our main case for the symmetrical view is that when some people, against a background of equal opportunities, do not exercise their responsibility to the same degree as others, they cannot justifiably call for equalizing measures to be put in place. Indeed, such measures would be positively unfair. The symmetrical view, accordingly, rejects compensation in such cases, whereas the asymmetrical view, implausibly, enjoins it. We also examine two objections to this argument. First, that this view fails to qualify as genuinely egalitarian, instead collapsing the notion of equality into the notion of desert. Second, that the opposing asymmetrical view, in contrast to the symmetrical view, can draw support from its compatibility with sufficientarian concerns. Both objections are rebutted. We conclude that luck egalitarians are best served by endorsing the symmetrical, luck-neutralizing stance. |
英文关键词 | Luck egalitarianism Unjust equalities Sufficientarianism Desert Shlomi Segall |
类型 | Article |
语种 | 英语 |
收录类别 | AHCI |
WOS记录号 | WOS:000333243800011 |
WOS关键词 | BRUTE LUCK ; OPPORTUNITY ; SUFFICIENCY |
WOS类目 | Philosophy |
WOS研究方向 | Philosophy |
资源类型 | 期刊论文 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.177/qdio/handle/2XILL650/361328 |
作者单位 | [Albertsen, Andreas; Midtgaard, Soren Flinch] Aarhus Univ, Aarhus, Denmark |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Albertsen, Andreas,Midtgaard, Soren Flinch. Unjust Equalities[J],2014,17(2):335-346. |
APA | Albertsen, Andreas,&Midtgaard, Soren Flinch.(2014).Unjust Equalities.ETHICAL THEORY AND MORAL PRACTICE,17(2),335-346. |
MLA | Albertsen, Andreas,et al."Unjust Equalities".ETHICAL THEORY AND MORAL PRACTICE 17.2(2014):335-346. |
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