干旱区生态环境知识资源中心(Arid): Merit, fit, and basic desert

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DOI	10.1080/13869795.2013.786971
	Merit, fit, and basic desert
	Haas, Daniel
通讯作者	Haas, D (corresponding author), Florida State Univ, Dept Philosophy, Tallahassee, FL 32306 USA.
来源期刊	PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATIONS
ISSN	1386-9795
EISSN	1741-5918
出版年	2013
卷号	16 期号:2 页码:226-239
英文摘要	Basic desert is central to the dispute between compatibilists and incompatibilists over the four-case manipulation argument. I argue that there are two distinct ways of understanding the desert salient to moral responsibility; moral desert can be understood as a claim about fitting responses to an agent or as a claim about the merit of the agent. Failing to recognize this distinction has contributed to a stalemate between both sides. I suggest that recognizing these distinct approaches to moral desert will help clarify a central source of disagreement between compatibilists and incompatibilists and assist both sides in resolving the current stalemate.
英文关键词	basic desert moral responsibility four-case argument manipulation compatibilism merit fit
类型	Article
语种	英语
收录类别	AHCI
WOS记录号	WOS:000320361000010
WOS关键词	HARD ; INCOMPATIBILISM
WOS类目	Philosophy
WOS研究方向	Philosophy
资源类型	期刊论文
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.177/qdio/handle/2XILL650/361095
作者单位	Florida State Univ, Dept Philosophy, Tallahassee, FL 32306 USA
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Haas, Daniel. Merit, fit, and basic desert[J],2013,16(2):226-239.
APA	Haas, Daniel.(2013).Merit, fit, and basic desert.PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATIONS,16(2),226-239.
MLA	Haas, Daniel."Merit, fit, and basic desert".PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATIONS 16.2(2013):226-239.

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