Arid
项目编号41401645
生态补偿中减少信息租金的机制设计——以张掖市为例
邓晓红
主持机构中国科学院寒区旱区环境与工程研究所
开始日期2015
结束日期2017
资助经费230000(CNY)
项目类别青年科学基金项目
资助机构CN-NSFC(国家自然科学基金)
语种中文
国家中国
英文简介In Payments for Environmental Services(PES) scheme, the opportunity costs of providing Environmental Services(ES) are the landowners’ private information, which farmers tend to hide and overstate. Because of the asymmetric information between landowners and conservation agents in the markets, there is problem of “information rents”, which can limit the effectiveness of PES systems and can make them expensive to implement. The research topic of this project is the mechanism design for reduction of information rents in PES based on Asymmetric Information. There are three policy mechanisms which can reduce information rents in varying degrees in PES programs: (1) gathering more information on landowners in the form of costly-to-fake signals, and then using this information to deduce landowners’ true opportunity costs; (2) screening contracts to differentiate the various types of landowners; and (3) using procurement auctions to introduce competitive forces so as to reduce the information rents.. This project proposes to use panel data model, Principal-agent model, mechanism design theory and auction theory to design the three policy mechanisms as above. Then use field investigation and experiment to analyze the ability of reducing information rent in the study area. The results of this project would provide scientific evidence to formulate the compensation in PES.
来源机构中国科学院西北生态环境资源研究院
资源类型项目
条目标识符http://119.78.100.177/qdio/handle/2XILL650/346771
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
邓晓红.生态补偿中减少信息租金的机制设计——以张掖市为例.2015.
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