Arid
DOI10.4453/rifp.2017.0021
A Pragmatic and Empirical Approach to Free Will Response
Pereboom, Derk
通讯作者Pereboom, D
来源期刊RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI FILOSOFIA E PSICOLOGIA
ISSN2039-4667
EISSN2239-2629
出版年2017
卷号8期号:3页码:259-265
英文摘要What is at stake in the debate between those, such as Sam Harris and me, who contend that we would lack free will on the supposition that we are causally determined agents, and those that defend the claim that we might then retain free will, such as Daniel Dennett? I agree with Dennett that on the supposition of causal determination there would be robust ways in which we could shape, control, and cause our actions. But I deny that on this supposition we would have the control in action required for us to basically deserve to be blamed, praised, punished or rewarded. In this response, I argue that this is the core issue that divides compatibilists and incompatiblists about free will and causal determination, and that the in-compatibilist position is the right one to accept.
英文关键词Sam Harris Daniel Dennett Free Will Skepticism Compatibilism Incompatibilism
类型Editorial Material
语种英语
开放获取类型DOAJ Gold
收录类别ESCI
WOS记录号WOS:000423922300005
WOS关键词SKEPTICISM ; DESERT
WOS类目Philosophy ; Psychology, Multidisciplinary
WOS研究方向Philosophy ; Psychology
资源类型期刊论文
条目标识符http://119.78.100.177/qdio/handle/2XILL650/332498
作者单位[Pereboom, Derk] Cornell Univ, Sage Sch Philosophy, Goldwin Smith Hall 218, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA
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Pereboom, Derk. A Pragmatic and Empirical Approach to Free Will Response[J],2017,8(3):259-265.
APA Pereboom, Derk.(2017).A Pragmatic and Empirical Approach to Free Will Response.RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI FILOSOFIA E PSICOLOGIA,8(3),259-265.
MLA Pereboom, Derk."A Pragmatic and Empirical Approach to Free Will Response".RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI FILOSOFIA E PSICOLOGIA 8.3(2017):259-265.
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