Arid
DOI10.1386/pjss.6.1.15_1
Institutional incentives for strategic voting and party system change in Portugal
Gschwend, Thomas
通讯作者Gschwend, T
来源期刊PORTUGUESE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
ISSN1476-413X
EISSN1758-9509
出版年2007
卷号6期号:1页码:15-31
英文摘要Looking more closely at the way people form expectations about the possible outcome of the election in their electoral district I will provide evidence for the first time that strategic voting can be observed and predicted even in PR systems with large districts magnitudes, such as in Portugal. Employing district-level data from 1975-2002 I estimate that a party, who is expected to win no seat, will be strategically deserted on average by about 3 per cent of the voters. This number does systematically vary with the district magnitude of each district. Nevertheless even in Portugal's largest electoral district, Lisbon, strategic voting can be observed to have a systematic impact on parties vote shares. Moreover there is evidence that strategic voting can partly account for the majoritarian trend that can be observed within the Portuguese party system.
英文关键词elections proportional representation strategic voting party systems electoral behaviour
类型Article
语种英语
收录类别ESCI
WOS记录号WOS:000219103000002
WOS类目Area Studies
WOS研究方向Area Studies
资源类型期刊论文
条目标识符http://119.78.100.177/qdio/handle/2XILL650/328921
作者单位[Gschwend, Thomas] Univ Mannheim, Zentrum Europa Sozialforsch MZES, D-68131 Mannheim, Germany
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Gschwend, Thomas. Institutional incentives for strategic voting and party system change in Portugal[J],2007,6(1):15-31.
APA Gschwend, Thomas.(2007).Institutional incentives for strategic voting and party system change in Portugal.PORTUGUESE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE,6(1),15-31.
MLA Gschwend, Thomas."Institutional incentives for strategic voting and party system change in Portugal".PORTUGUESE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 6.1(2007):15-31.
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