Knowledge Resource Center for Ecological Environment in Arid Area
DOI | 10.1007/s12152-018-9357-8 |
Justice without Retribution: An Epistemic Argument against Retributive Criminal Punishment | |
Caruso, Gregg D. | |
通讯作者 | Caruso, Gregg D. |
来源期刊 | NEUROETHICS
![]() |
ISSN | 1874-5490 |
EISSN | 1874-5504 |
出版年 | 2020 |
卷号 | 13期号:1页码:13-28 |
英文摘要 | Within the United States, the most prominent justification for criminal punishment is retributivism. This retributivist justification for punishment maintains that punishment of a wrongdoer is justified for the reason that she deserves something bad to happen to her just because she has knowingly done wrong-this could include pain, deprivation, or death. For the retributivist, it is the basic desert attached to the criminal's immoral action alone that provides the justification for punishment. This means that the retributivist position is not reducible to consequentialist considerations nor in justifying punishment does it appeal to wider goods such as the safety of society or the moral improvement of those being punished. A number of sentencing guidelines in the U.S. have adopted desert as their distributive principle, and it is increasingly given deference in the purposes section of state criminal codes, where it can be the guiding principle in the interpretation and application of the code's provisions. Indeed, the American Law Institute recently revised the Model Penal Code so as to set desert as the official dominate principle for sentencing. And courts have identified desert as the guiding principle in a variety of contexts, as with the Supreme Court's enthroning retributivism as the primary justification for the death penalty. While retributivism provides one of the main sources of justification for punishment within the criminal justice system, there are good philosophical and practical reasons for rejecting it. One such reason is that it is unclear that agents truly deserve to suffer for the wrongs they have done in the sense required by retributivism. In the first section, I explore the retributivist justification of punishment and explain why it is inconsistent with free will skepticism. In the second section, I then argue that even if one is not convinced by the arguments for free will skepticism, there remains a strong epistemic argument against causing harm on retributivist grounds that undermines both libertarian and compatibilist attempts to justify it. I maintain that this argument provides sufficient reason for rejecting the retributive justification of criminal punishment. I conclude in the third section by briefly sketching my public health-quarantine model, a non-retributive alternative for addressing criminal behavior that draws on the public health framework and prioritizes prevention and social justice. I argue that the model is not only consistent with free will skepticism and the epistemic argument against retributivism, it also provides the most justified, humane, and effective way of dealing with criminal behavior. |
英文关键词 | Retributivism Punishment Criminal law Criminal justice Free will Moral responsibility Free will skepticism Compatibilism Libertarianism Desert Public health Quarantine Basic desert Justice Social justice Prison Retributive justice Burden of proof |
类型 | Article |
语种 | 英语 |
国家 | USA |
收录类别 | SCI-E ; SSCI |
WOS记录号 | WOS:000524953200003 |
WOS类目 | Ethics ; Medical Ethics ; Social Sciences, Biomedical |
WOS研究方向 | Social Sciences - Other Topics ; Medical Ethics ; Biomedical Social Sciences |
资源类型 | 期刊论文 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.177/qdio/handle/2XILL650/315230 |
作者单位 | SUNY Corning, 152 Watauga Ave, Corning, NY 14830 USA |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Caruso, Gregg D.. Justice without Retribution: An Epistemic Argument against Retributive Criminal Punishment[J],2020,13(1):13-28. |
APA | Caruso, Gregg D..(2020).Justice without Retribution: An Epistemic Argument against Retributive Criminal Punishment.NEUROETHICS,13(1),13-28. |
MLA | Caruso, Gregg D.."Justice without Retribution: An Epistemic Argument against Retributive Criminal Punishment".NEUROETHICS 13.1(2020):13-28. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
个性服务 |
推荐该条目 |
保存到收藏夹 |
导出为Endnote文件 |
谷歌学术 |
谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
[Caruso, Gregg D.]的文章 |
百度学术 |
百度学术中相似的文章 |
[Caruso, Gregg D.]的文章 |
必应学术 |
必应学术中相似的文章 |
[Caruso, Gregg D.]的文章 |
相关权益政策 |
暂无数据 |
收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。