Knowledge Resource Center for Ecological Environment in Arid Area
| 报告编号 | ADA465011 |
| Misfire: An Operational Critique of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Targeting Strategy. | |
| Martin, J. D. | |
| 英文摘要 | Joint force commanders (JFCs) utilized improper weapons to accomplish strategic objectives during the major combat operations phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM) dependency on Precision-Guided Munitions (PGMs) appeared to have decisive effects during the initial campaign of ’Shock and Awe.’ However, while PGMs were instrumental in accomplishing the primary national-strategic objective of regime removal in OIF, targeting concentrated exclusively on leadership, command and control (C2), and military equipment. Such a strategy enjoyed near-term success but failed to achieve the long-term ends of a politically stable Iraq. Rather than feeling soundly and convincingly beaten, Baathist leaders and Iraqi Army members merely retired from the battlespace to live to fight another day. Their efforts to inculcate insurgency groups, particularly within the Sunni population, created a well-spring of discontent. That discontent bred the terrorist factions with which the American military is currently embroiled. Less reliance on PGMs and a greater balance of coercive and destructive methods during OIF combat operations would have constituted an effects-based targeting strategy that would have satisfied all national-strategic objectives and established a smoother transition to stability operations. The denial strategy of Operation Desert Storm (ODS) was a prime example of attrition as an effective will- leveraging strategy in a limited war. In contrast, greater emphasis on attrition in OIF could have promoted a more stable peace at the end of major combat operations. While the firebombings of Dresden and Tokyo exemplify extremes in will-leveraging, JFCs may heed the success of coercive strategy and focus it upon the military personnel of today’s adversaries. Tomorrow’s JFC should employ the coercive strategy of denial against fielded and paramilitary forces with measured, yet ruthless control. |
| 英文关键词 | Military strategy Attrition Failure Targeting Guided weapons Iraqi war Combat forces Military history Leadership Targets Collateral damage Second world war Persian gulf war Insurgency Precision bombing Air power Military co |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 国家 | United States |
| URL | http://r.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?DbCode=KJBG&dbname=KJBGW&filename=59fd54b531c97d1d54add48b |
| 来源机构 | Non Paid ADAS |
| 资源类型 | 科技报告 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.177/qdio/handle/2XILL650/273355 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Martin, J. D.. Misfire: An Operational Critique of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Targeting Strategy.,2005. |
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