Arid
DOI10.1017/S0265052519000244
GUILT, GRIEF, AND THE GOOD
Robinson, Michael
通讯作者Robinson, Michael
来源期刊SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY & POLICY
ISSN0265-0525
EISSN1471-6437
出版年2019
卷号36期号:1页码:211-233
英文摘要In this essay, I consider a particular version of the thesis that the blameworthy deserve to suffer, namely, that they deserve to feel guilty to the proper degree (a thesis I call Desert-Guilt). Two further theses have been thought to explicate and support the thesis, one that appeals to the non-instrumental goodness of the blameworthy receiving what they deserve (in this case, the experience of guilt), and the other that appeals to the idea that being blameworthy provides reason to promote the blameworthy receiving what they deserve (again, in this case, the experience of guilt). I call the first Good-Guilt and the second Reason-Guilt. I begin by exploring what I take to be the strongest argument for Good-Guilt which gains force from a comparison of guilt and grief, and the strongest argument against. I conclude that Good-Guilt might be true, but that even if it is, the strongest argument in favor of it fails to support it in a way that provides reason for the thesis that the blameworthy deserve to feel guilty. I then consider the hypothesis that Reason-Guilt might be true and might be the more fundamental principle, supporting both Good-Guilt and Desert-Guilt. I argue that it does not succeed, however, and instead propose a different principle, according to which being blameworthy does not by itself provide reason for promoting that the blameworthy get what they deserve, but that being blameworthy systematically does so in conjunction with particular kinds of background circumstances. Finally, I conclude that Desert-Guilt might yet be true, but that it does not clearly gain support from either Good-Guilt or Reason-Guilt.
英文关键词guilt responsibility desert blameworthiness retributivism caring grief fittingness
类型Article
语种英语
国家USA
收录类别SSCI ; AHCI
WOS记录号WOS:000485020600012
WOS关键词FRANKFURT ; RESPONSIBILITY ; PRINCIPLE ; FREEDOM
WOS类目Ethics ; Philosophy ; Social Sciences, Interdisciplinary
WOS研究方向Social Sciences - Other Topics ; Philosophy
资源类型期刊论文
条目标识符http://119.78.100.177/qdio/handle/2XILL650/218856
作者单位Chapman Univ, Philosophy, Orange, CA 92866 USA
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Robinson, Michael. GUILT, GRIEF, AND THE GOOD[J],2019,36(1):211-233.
APA Robinson, Michael.(2019).GUILT, GRIEF, AND THE GOOD.SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY & POLICY,36(1),211-233.
MLA Robinson, Michael."GUILT, GRIEF, AND THE GOOD".SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY & POLICY 36.1(2019):211-233.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Robinson, Michael]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Robinson, Michael]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Robinson, Michael]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。